Modernity as Concern With Scepticism
The view that modern natural law theorists are distinguished from nonmodern (ancient and medieval) ones by their concern with, and their efforts to overcome, ancient scepticism and relativism, has been defended with particular vigour by Richard Tuck, but it also informs other influential scholarship.2 Tuck has defended this view in many of his books and articles, hut his most forceful statement is in his article 'The "modern" theory of natural law', on which I will focus here. 3 In the prolegomena of De jure belli, Grotius explicitly takes up the problem of scepticism. He makes Carneades the spokesman for scepticism, and quotes a passage where Carneades claims that justice is folly. In that passage, Carneades claims that prudential wisdom sometimes conflicts with the demands of justice, and that a person must therefore choose to be either wicked (unjust) or foolish (unwise). From this, Carneades concludes that justice either does not exist -apparently because the principle obeyed by people in general and by the wise in particular is always that of private advantage -or that, if it exists, it is 'the greatest folly', because it injures itself 'by promoting the interests of others'.4 In his prolegomena, Grotius Schneewind summarises a lot of his published writings in his impressive The invention of autonomy, a history of modern moral philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998), I will mainly refer to this source. For Haakonssen, I will in particular rely on his article 'Divine/naturallaw theories in ethics', in: The Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy, ed. Daniel
